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THE PROVISION OF WATER
SERVICES IN THE UK
THOMAS ZABEL*
T
he United Kingdom comprises four countries –
England,Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
The institutional and legal arrangements for the con-
trol of water services are the same in England and
Wales, whereas different approaches have been
developed in Scotland and Northern Ireland.Only in
England are the water services provided by private
companies whereas in Scotland and Northern Ireland
public companies are responsible for the water ser-
vices. In Wales a mutual non-profit organisation pro-
vides the water services. This paper concentrates on
the provision of water services in England and Wales
because of its uniqueness in Europe.
Regulatory regime
As the water services companies tend to be monop-
olies (only for some large customers has competition
been introduced) a strict regulatory regime is
required. In England and Wales this involves:
• the Environment Agency (EA) responsible for pol-
lution control and water resources management;
• the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) with the
responsibility for auditing the water companies to
ensure that they meet the requirements of the
Drinking Water Regulations;
• the Office of Water Services (Ofwat) responsible
for the economic regulation of the water compa-
nies including the setting of the price limits and
for ensuring that the water companies achieve
the required levels of service for their customers.
The economic regulator is advised by Customer
Services Committees representing the views of
the customers.
Privatisation of the water services in England
and Wales
The main reasons for the privatisation of the water
services in 1989 were the government policy at the
time to privatise utilities and the need for large
investments to comply with the EU Drinking and
Bathing Water Directives and the expected expendi-
ture for complying with the EU Urban Waste Water
Treatment Directive, which was being negotiated at
the time. Privatising the water services would
remove the investment requirements from the pub-
lic borrowing requirements of the government,
which were at the time under great strain. (In actual
fact the water services had been starved of invest-
ment over a long period as the public borrowing
requirements had been under strain for most of the
time since the Second World War).
To make the water services companies attractive to
investors £5 billion of their debt were written off for
the privatisation and a capital injection of £1.5 bil-
lion was provided as “green dowry” to deal with the
urgently required environmental improvements. In
turn £5.225 billion was raised from investors for the
treasury. Some of the write-off in debt was recouped
in 1997 by the £1.673 billion “windfall tax” levied on
the companies by the newly elected Labour govern-
ment.The water services companies were sold to the
public in a share offering,with some preference been
given to the customers of the particular companies.
Water companies 
Initially the structure of the private water companies
consisted of a holding company (e.g. Thames Water
plc) which was quoted on the stock exchange and
subsidiary companies. One of the subsidiary compa-
nies was the Water Services Limited Company
(WSC), which provides the water supply and sewer-
age services and was regulated by Ofwat in terms of
the price limits and level of service it must achieve.
The other subsidiary companies were generally not
regulated unless they were another regulated com-
pany (e.g. electricity supplier).To enhance the profit
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Centre in Swindon, UK.potential of the holding company the companies
invested in various different businesses. However, in
recent years many of the companies have started to
sell off the non-regulated businesses to concentrate
mainly on the regulated business.
The water companies have changed greatly since pri-
vatisation. Some water companies have diversified
into other regulated businesses. For instance, North
West Water took over an electricity supplier where-
as other companies (e.g.Southern Water) were taken
over by an electricity supplier or were bought by for-
eign companies (e.g. Northumbrian Water by Ly-
onnaise des Eaux or Wessex Water by Enron from
the US). Some companies have had several owners
since privatisation. For instance, Thames Water was
initially bought by the German company RWE but
has recently been sold to an Australian syndicate and
Wessex Water has been sold to a Malaysian compa-
ny whereas Northumbrian Water has been re-floated
on the UK stock market.
Welsh Water has undergone the most radical change
in ownership.It was initially bought by the American
company, Western Power Distribution, but was sub-
sequently resold to Glas Cymru, a non-profit compa-
ny set up with the sole purpose of acquiring and own-
ing Welsh Water. Glas Cymru financed the purchase
of Welsh Water by a bond issue.The company is oper-
ated as if it was registered on the stock exchange.
However,it does not pay any dividend,is not allowed
to diversify into other business areas and any finan-
cial surpluses made have to be reinvested in the busi-
ness to the benefit of the customers. It is controlled
by a membership board which has to report to the
Welsh National Assembly. The customers are not
liable for any potential losses of the company. Most
of the activities of the company are outsourced to
other companies by competitive tendering.
Although different ownerships of the water compa-
nies have been established, all companies have to
ring fence the water service functions from any other
activity, as these functions are controlled by Ofwat.
The water companies operate under a 25-year
licence and own all their assets.
In addition to the changes in ownership there has
also been considerable consolidation of the water
companies since 1989 involving the merger of some
of the Water only Companies (WoCs) and the merg-
er of some WoCs with the WSCs,in whose catchment
they operated.
There are currently ten Water Services Companies
(WSCs) in England and Wales, which are catchment
based and responsible for both water supply and
sewerage services. In addition there are 13 WoCs,
which provide approximately 25 percent of the
drinking water within the areas of the WSCs
(Ofwat/DEFRA 2006).
The water services system
The water services system in England and Wales is a
mature system with 99 percent of the population
connected to the public water supply and 96 percent
to the sewerage system.
However, the system is quite old with, for instance,
50 percent of the sewerage system dating from
before 1944 and 25 percent before 1918 (Andrews et
al. 1998). Similarly the water distribution system is
quite old with high levels of leakage being experi-
enced.The total leakage in 1994/95 was about 30 per-
cent of water put into the distribution system.Of this
23 percent was attributed to leakage from the com-
panies distribution system and 7 percent to leakage
from the customer’s supply pipes (Ofwat 1996). In
response to the draught in 1995, leakage reduction
targets based on the economic level of leakage have
been set for the different companies and substantial
investments have been made to reduce leakage.
Leakage has been reduced from 5,112 ML/d in
1994–95 to 3,649 ML/d in 2003–04, a reduction of
nearly 30 percent (Ofwat/DEFRA 2006).
Substantial investments are also required to replace
lead pipes. The occurrence of lead pipes in England
and Wales is shown in Table 1.
Approximately 24 percent of dwellings are currently
equipped with water meters with the highest pene-
tration of meters in areas with periodic water short-
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ages (e.g. Anglia). It is anticipated that this will
increase to 36 percent by 2009/10. Water companies
in water scarcity areas can apply to the secretary of
state for “water scarcity status”, which if approved
would allow the water company to install water
meters on a compulsory basis. It is claimed that
water meters reduce water consumption by about
10 percent. One Water only Company, Folkestone
and Dover,has already been given approval for com-
pulsory water metering, as it has been granted
“water scarcity status”. About 50 percent of its
households are already metered and this is expected
to increase to 90 percent by 2015. Discussions are,
however, still taking place to develop methods to
assist low income families who are likely to be most
disadvantaged by moving to metering.
Large investments were also required for the imple-
mentation of the EU Urban Waste Water Treatment
Directive.Although 96 percent of the population was
connected to sewers in 1996/97 in England and Wales,
only 83 percent of the sewage discharged to sewers
received at least secondary (biological) treatment
(Waterfacts 1997). By December 2003 this had
increased to 98 percent of the agglomerations of
>15,000 PE being in compliance with the require-
ment for secondary treatment. However, there is dis-
agreement between the European Commission and
the UK regarding the designation of sensitive areas
and in turn the requirement for additional tertiary
treatment. Further investments may therefore be
required depending on the outcome of the discus-
sions (European Commission 2007).
Setting price limits
As the water companies are largely monopolies
despite the attempts to introduce competition, the
setting of price limits is an important function of
Ofwat. In setting the price limits the director gener-
al of Ofwat has to strike a careful balance between
the quality improvements required to meet the legal
obligations as a result of European legislation and
national requirements, the charge the customers can
afford and the ability of the companies to raise the
funds to make the improvements.The EA and DWI
lay down the quality improvements required for
effluent discharges and drinking water quality,
respectively. Ofwat subsequently considers the
impact of these on the prices for water services. In
case of conflict between the regulators the Secretary
of State for the Environment provides guidance on
the quality improvements to be achieved above
those required by EU legislation taking into account
the impact on the charges for the consumers.
Based on the agreement reached each water compa-
ny has to provide detailed information to Ofwat on
the investment needs required to achieve the
improvements, any finance needed to meet the
required extension of the system and on the operat-
ing costs of the system in so-called business plans.
Ofwat uses these business plans, which have to be
prepared every five years, for setting the price limits
for each individual company.This takes into account
the investments the companies are required to make,
the efficiency improvements companies should be
able to make (based on comparisons with the other
companies) and by allowing a certain return on the
existing assets. To assist in the price setting Ofwat
publishes every year the so-called “July returns”,
which contain detailed cost data for the previous
year and operating statistics such as the length of the
pipelines for the different water companies. These
data are used to predict how far companies could cut
their costs based on the performance of the other
companies. This method of cost comparisons is
termed “yardstick” regulation (Green 1999).
Although the charges are generally set for a five-
year period, “interim determinations” can be made
if, for instance, the cost of capital changes signifi-
cantly from those used in the five-year determina-
tion or if other costs arise (e.g. if an increase in the
provision of water meters above those envisaged in
the business plan are required).
The drivers that are taken into account in the deter-
mination of the charges are listed in Table 2, which
shows that if companies have made larger profits
than anticipated at the time of the price setting this
can be reclaimed in the price setting exercise for the
following five-year period by passing on this “past
out-performance” to the consumers.
The table indicates that the average household bill
will rise by £46 over the five-year period 2004-05 to
2009-10. However, this increase in charges would
have been £16 higher if Ofwat had not claimed the
higher than expected efficiency improvements the
companies made over the past five years (£3) and
taken into account the efficiency improvements the
companies should be able to make over the next five
years (£13).The price limits are based on the performance of
the best group of companies and allow companies a
certain level of return on their regulatory capital.
When setting the price limits, several factors are
considered:
• The cost of quality improvements required taking
into account how efficient the other companies
can achieve this;
• The greater operating efficiency companies must
achieve, which is again based on what the best
group of companies can achieve;
• The cost of any growth of the system and agreed
improvements in the level of service;
• A capital maintenance allowance for the renewal
of the system (e.g. no depreciation is charged on
underground assets).
The price limit (P (%)) for each company is
expressed as
P = RPI + K,
where RPI is the percentage increase in the retail
price index and K is the real percentage in-
crease/decrease in price above the retail price index
the companies are allowed to raise the basket of
their charges.The tariff basket formula is a complex
mechanism for weighting increases in individual tar-
iffs for unmetered water and sewage, metered water
and sewage, and trade effluent.
For the first ten-year period after privatisation
1989/90 to 1999/00 the average annual K-factor was
set at a generous 5.5 percent taking into account the
large investments the companies had to make.
However, as the companies were able to achieve
much larger profits than was anticipated the price
limit were reviewed after 5 years and the annual K-
factor for the second five year period 1994/95–
1999/00 was reduced to 1.5 percent. The third price
review took place in 1999, which resulted in an aver-
age one-off price reduction in the first year of the
period 1999/00–2004/05 of 12.3 percent and an aver-
age K value of – 2.1 percent over the five-year peri-
od,resulting for some companies in real price reduc-
tions ignoring the impact of inflation on the charges.
This was partly politically motivated as it coincided
with a change in government.The latest price review
took place in 2004 and will result in significant price
increases over the next five years. This is in realisa-
tion of the great need of the companies to invest to
meet the different targets set by the regulators for
quality improvements but also to renew the system
to meet the leakage targets.
The price limits set for the different companies for
the next five years is given in Table 3.
A comparison of the demands made by the water
companies in their business plans for price increases
to achieve the required improvements and the price
limits laid down by Ofwat, taking into account the
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Table 2 
The drivers for changes in the average expected householdbills 2004–05 to 2009–10 
in £
Average household bill in 2004–05 249
1) past efficiency savings and out-performance (3) Less
2) scope for reduction through future efficiency improvements (13)
3) maintaining basic services of which
a) changes in revenue
b) changes in operating costs
c) changes in capital maintenance 








4) maintaining security of supply to all customers 11
Plus
5) the impact of improvements in services
 of which 
a) drinking water quality
 b) environmental improvements





Average household bill in 2009–10 295
Change 2004–05 to 2009–10 46
Note: ( ) = negative change.
Source: Ofwat (2004).CESifo DICE Report 2/2007 17
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efficiency improvements the companies are required
to make, are given in Table 4. This shows that the
price increases approved by Ofwat are considerably
lower than those requested by the companies in their
business plans. Ofwat is required to set out for each
company how its business plan compares with the
final determination issued by Ofwat.
Investment
Consistently large investments have been made
since privatisation with a total of £50 billion being
invested since privatisation for new assets and the
maintenance of the existing assets.The current five-
year plan (2005/06–2009/10) requires further invest-
ments of £16.8 billion equivalent to £732/household
(Ofwat 2004).
Although a significant part of the investments are
funded by the charges for the water services the
industry also had to borrow substantially to meet
this investment programme. From virtually zero at
privatisation net borrowing in 2004–05 exceeded
£22.5 billion and the gearing went up from near zero
to 61 percent in 2004–05 (Ofwat 2005).
Charges
As discussed above, only 24 percent of households
are equipped with water meters whereas the remain-
der is charged according to the rateable value of
their property. The charges for metered customers
are lower than those for unmetered customers as
usually those with low water consumption tend to
volunteer to have a meter installed.The charges for
water supply and sewerage services are shown in
Table 5. There are considerable differences in the
charges between the companies depending whether
they are mainly rural or urban. Companies with a
large rural population (e.g. Anglian) usually have
higher charges than those with a more urban popu-
lation (e.g.Thames). In addition companies with a
long coastline (e.g. South West) tend to have higher
sewerage charges than those with no or a short
Table 3 
Price limits for the period2005–06 to 2009–10 
Annual price limits (k) %
Company 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 Average
a)
Anglian 3.8 0.0 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.4
Dwr Cymru 14.2 3.6 4.1 3.3 2.2 5.4
Northumbrian 6.5 3.7 3.2 1.0 0.6 3.0
Severn Trent 11.8 4.8 2.0 1.7 2.3 4.5
South West 12.5 9.8 9.8 1.7 1.4 6.9
Southern 12.6 3.9 3.5 5.8 2.6 5.6
Thames 14.9 2.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 4.1
United Utilities 5.0 6.4 4.4 3.5 3.0 4.5
Wessex 8.9 4.9 5.6 4.0 2.9 5.2
Yorkshire 5.5 4.9 3.6 3.6 2.1 3.9
WSC average 
(weighted) 9.4 4.0 3.4 2.7 2.2 4.3
WoC average 
(weighted) 12.4 1.9 1.5 0.4 -0.3 3.1
Industry average
(weighted) 9.6 3.6 3.2 2.5 2.0 4.2
a) The average for the price limits is the geometric average of the annual price limits. WSC - water and sewage
companies, WoC - water only companies.
 Source: Ofwat (2004).
Table 4 
Comparison of the industry average price limits (%) with the companies’ business plans for 2005–10
Price limits 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 Average
B u s i n e s s  p l a n s 1 3 . 47 . 14 . 63 . 42 . 96 . 2
Final determination 9.6 3.9 3.2 2.5 2.0 4.2
 Source: Ofwat (2004).coastline (e.g. Severn Trent). The charges include
charges for surface and road run off. However, the
highway authorities usually pay for the cost of high-
way drainage from motorways and trunk roads out-
side towns, as the drainage from these roads is not
discharged to company sewers.The metered charges
consist of a standing and a volumetric charge, which
are different for the different companies and can
vary within a company.
The development of the prices for water services in
England and Wales since privatisation are shown in
the Figure, which shows the significant price reduc-
tions imposed in the period 2000/01 to 2003/04 and
the expected relatively steep price increases for the
current five- year period.
Manpower
Since privatisation the number
of people employed by the
water companies has decreased
substantially from 47,768 in 1989
(Waterfacts 1997) to about
35,000 in 2005/06 (UK Water
2006). Some of the staff lost
have, however, been replaced by
contractors.
Levels of service
Besides setting the price limits
for water services for the differ-
ent water companies Ofwat also
has the task of monitoring the
levels of service the companies
achieve for their customers,
which are part of the license con-
ditions. Ofwat publishes the lev-
els of service achieved by the dif-
ferent companies annually. Ge-
nerally the companies have
achieved consistent improve-
ments in the level of service to
the customers since privatisation
(Table 6; Ofwat 2006). However,
three companies are being inves-
tigated in respect to their res-
ponse to customer complaints
(DG7 and DG9). They have to
provide action plans of how they
aim to improve the response to
customers’ complaints and Ofwat intends to impose
financial penalties on the three companies for failing
to meet the required level of service and for misre-
porting compliance with the standards.
Under the Guaranteed Standards Scheme (GSS),
which was introduced in 1989 and revised in 2000, cus-
tomers are entitled to automatic payments of £20 (£25
for low pressure) by the water companies if certain
standards are not met. In addition all but two compa-
nies have introduced enhanced compensation payment
schemes, which fall outside the GSS scheme.The num-
ber of payments made under the guaranteed scheme in
2005–06 was 20,000 and under the enhanced scheme
14,000. The total payments made by the companies in
2005–06 amounted to £1.4 million (Ofwat 2006).
In addition significant improvements have been
made in compliance with the drinking water stan-
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Table 5 
















Anglian 147 199 116 158
Dwr Cymru 114 199 105 153
Northumbrian 124 145 94 114
Severn Trent 118 125 113 135
South West 194 323 116 177
Southern 167 202 103 109
Thames 100 103 133 155
United Utility 140 157 124 139
Wessex 133 178 116 155
Yorkshire 119 145 111 133
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dards since privatisation with 99.89 percent of the
samples taken complying with the standards in 2005
(UK Water 2006) compared to 99.0 percent in 1990
(Ofwat 1999).
Affordability of water services
There are two mechanisms in the UK, which con-
tribute to the affordability of the charges for water
services. Firstly, the large companies operate a
charge equalisation system within their area with all
customers within a company area having generally
the same charges.Secondly,customers living alone or
those with low water use (e.g. pensioners or wid-
ows/widowers) can opt for having the water services
charges assessed based on the actual consumption by
requesting the installation of a free water meter. For
the non-metered customers the sewerage charges
are assessed based on the rateable value of the prop-
erty, which tends to be lower for houses of lower
value,in which the poorer sections of the population
with larger families tend to live.Therefore the richer
tend to subsidise the poorer sections of society. For
those unable to pay the water services bills
allowances for water services are made in their social
security payments. The most vulnerable customers
on a water meter who face high charges because they
have three or more children or those with special
medical needs who require high water use are enti-
tled to apply for a capped tariff.The number of cus-
tomers entitled to a capped tariff has increased from
6,000 in 2002/03 to 14,000 in 2004/05 (Water UK
2006). Finally, Value Added Tax (VAT) is not
charged on domestic water services in the UK.
Since the adoption of the Water Services Act 1999,
which outlawed the disconnection of water services,
the household revenue the industry is writing off as
a result of non-payment has increased by 46 percent
to £103 million in 2005–06. The total revenue out-
standing for more than 12 months,which is more dif-
ficult to collect, has increased to £491 million in
2005–06. The cost arising from bad debt collection
Table 6 
Improvements inlevels of service achievedby the water companies since privatisation
a)
in %
Description 1990–91 2000–01 2005–06
DG 2 Properties at riskof low water pressure 1.85 0.11 0.02
DG 3 Properties subject to unplanned interruptions
of 12 hours or more 0.42 0.11 0.08
DG 4 Population subject to hosepipe bans 41 0 7
DG5 Properties subject to sewer flooding incidents
(overloaded sewers and other causes) 0.05
b) 0.03 0.02
DG5 Properties at riskof sewer flooding incidents
(once in ten years) –0 . 0 90 . 0 2
DG5 Properties at riskof sewer flooding incidents
(twice in ten years) – 0.03 0.01
DG6 Billing contacts not responded to within
 5  working  days 31.18 0.86 (4.44)
c)
DG7 Written complaints not responded to within
 10  working  days 31.09 0.44 (3.08)
d)
DG8 Bills not based on meter readings 3.67
e) 0.72 0.52
DG9 Received telephone calls not answered within
 30 seconds 26.97
f) 7.64 –
g)
DG9 Telephone call handling
 – Calls abandoned 
 – All  lines busy












a) It is not appropriate to add the totals for each indicator to determine the overall total of customers receiving poor
service. Some customers may be included in more than one row. For example a customer of low pressure  (DG2) may
alsohave written to the company to complain(DG7). Where information was not collected this is shown by a dash(–).
b) 1992–93. – 
c) Excluding the three companies under investigation the figure would have been 0.42%. –
d) Excluding
the three companies under investigation the figure would have been 0.14%. – 
e) 1995–96. – 
f) 1996–97. – 
g) This was
replaced in 2005-06 by DG9 Telephone call handling. –
h) Excluding the three companies under investigation the figure
would have been 4.6%. –
i) Excluding the three companies under investigation the figure wouldhave been0.9%
  Source: Ofwat (1999 and 2006).activities, write offs of bad debt and financing costs
associated with un-recovered revenue amounts to
around £11 per household (Ofwat 2006a).
Competition
The Water Act 2003 had the aim to introduce greater
competition into the water industry.This is however,
currently restricted to large water users (e.g. large
industry using more than 50 million ltr/year). The
provision in the act to increase competition by allow-
ing other providers to use the network of existing
providers has so far not been taken up.
Conclusions
• The water industry in England and Wales is high-
ly regulated. The regulatory regime set up at pri-
vatisation has been effective in protecting con-
sumers and the environment. Both the industry
and the regulators have to provide regular infor-
mation on the performance of the industry.
• A major aim of privatisation was to free the
industry of political interference. However, there
is still extensive political influence especially re-
lated to the required quality improvements but
also the prices the industry is allowed to charge.
• Prices for water services have increased signifi-
cantly since privatisation as a result of the large
investments the companies had to make to
improve the system and to comply with EU legis-
lation and national quality improvement require-
ments. However, because of the efficiency im-
provements the water companies had to achieve
these price increases are lower than would have
been expected based on the investment needs and
operating costs.
• Privatisation allowed the water companies to
raise the finance to make the necessary invest-
ments independently of the national budget,
which traditionally has been limited and in the
past has starved the industry of the necessary
investments. Over £50 billion has been invested
since privatisation in England and Wales with a
further £16.8 billion forecast for the current five-
year period.
• The levels of service achieved by the water com-
panies has improved significantly since privatisa-
tion as a result of the close scrutiny by Ofwat but
also because of a greater focus on the customers
by the private water companies.
• Both the level of leakage and the compliance with
legislative standards have improved significantly
since privatisation because of the strict regulatory
regime but also as sufficient funds were made
available to improve the system.
• Water companies have been forced to increasing-
ly fund the improvements through increased lev-
els of debt rather than raising prices.
• Manpower has been decreased significantly since
privatisation, as result of the efficiency improve-
ments the companies have made.
• Since the adoption of the law,which outlawed the
disconnection of water services, the level of non-
payment of water charges and the cost of collect-
ing outstanding debt has increased significantly.
• Competition is so far restricted to large water
users.
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